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Abstract
Libertarianism is defined both by its foundations and by the institutions to which it 
typically is said to give rise. In this paper it is argued that while a system of economic 
competition can be defended on consequentialist grounds, such arguments are not 
available to deontological libertarians. Thus it is concluded that deontological 
libertarians cannot provide a foundation for the type of economic system they favour.
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Introduction
Section 1: Libertarianism and Economic Competition
Libertarianism is commonly characterised both by its institutions and by its 
foundations. Institutionally it is associated with the idea of a minimal state,1
restricted to the narrow functions of protecting citizens from each other and from 
non-citizens, and providing enforcement of private contracts. Typically 
libertarians assume that alongside this comes the economic institutions of a pure 
form of capitalism, including strong private property rights, low or no taxation, 
and free competition among potential producers of goods and services. 
Foundationally, libertarianism, in its deontological form, is variously 
claimed to be based on individual rights to self-ownership, or to liberty. There 
are, of course, also consequentialist versions of libertarianism, or, at least, 
versions of libertarianism with a consequentialist strand. One sees something like 
this view in the writings, for example, of Milton Friedman.2 Often advocates of 
such views are less theoretically self-conscious than their deontological 
colleagues, appealing to various considerations without investigating the 
relations between them or the further consequences of adopting the doctrines in 
question. Consequentialist libertarianism, whether consequentialist in whole or 
part,  thus offers a hostage to fortune, and is open to lines of criticism based on 
the calculation of consequences. So, for example, if a new version of market 
                                                
1  Nozickian libertarianism, of course, allows people voluntarily to contract into a 
more than minimal state, if that is what they wish to do. For present purposes I 
ignore the ‘left-libertarianism’ of Steiner, Vallentyne, Otsuka and others. See …
3socialism could be devised which had all the benefits of capitalism and some 
others beside, fully consequentialist libertarians would seem bound, in theory at 
least, to reject capitalism in favour of this alternative theory.  Those holding a 
hybrid view would have to decide where their loyalties lie. Thus to those of a 
certain cast of mind, deontological libertarianism, with its austere ontology of 
moral premises, appears the more rigorous, appealing, and defensible version. 
My aim here is very simple. It is to argue that deontological libertarianism 
cannot unproblematically deliver the defence of capitalism to which it aspires, or 
at least not in a way that avoids begging the question. The case of economic 
competition will be used to attempt to demonstrate this.
1. Economic Competition.
Free economic competition is essentially equivalent to the idea of ‘no entry 
barriers’. Anyone may, in principle, may offer for sale any good or service. Of 
course financial constraints may make it, in practice, impossible for someone to 
compete in particular areas, but a system of free competition places no legal 
restrictions on individuals producing or offering for sale any good or service. In 
any developed economy economic competition takes a number of forms. H.B. 
Acton usefully distinguished four spheres of economic competition in a capitalist 
economy: for contracts; between ‘suppliers of labour’; between employers of 
labour; and to sell to consumers.3 Quite likely this is not an exhaustive (or 
indeed, exclusive) classification, but it will serve to illustrate the scope of 
competition. 
                                                                                                                                                
2 Capitalism and Freedom, Free to Choose
3 H.B. Acton, The Morals of Markets and Related Essays, edd J. Shearmur and D 
Gordon (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1993), pp. 71-79 (First published 1971)
4Economic competition is, of course, celebrated for a number of reasons. 
One set of considerations derive from ideas of freedom; simply the freedom to 
produce, buy and sell what one wishes. Those who, for some reason, are 
prohibited from one or more of these activities may feel deeply frustrated. As 
Nozick famously puts it ‘a socialist society would have to ban capitalistic acts 
between consenting adults’. This thought can be taken in a number of directions: 
as a complaint against the suppression of liberty; or, perhaps, as a complaint 
against the violation of rights. But in sum the freedom arguments for 
competition focus on the rights and liberties of producers and sellers of goods.
A second set of considerations points to the economic advantages of 
competition. Free competition is the enemy of complacency. In a competitive 
environment there is no opportunity to relax, for this may allow one’s 
competitors to innovate by either producing a better product or finding a 
cheaper way of producing or selling existing products. Producers and retailers 
are kept on their toes. The need for economic survival against competition keeps 
prices down and quality up. This, quite obviously, is to the advantage of the 
consumer, and provides a very powerful consequentialist argument for 
competition.
Yet despite the common lauding of economic competition, historically the 
arguments have not all been one way. Economic competition, and competitive 
behaviour in general, has been the object of moral concern for many reasons, 
although I think we can divide them into four main groups:
a) That the competitive individual displays an unattractive character.
b) That social relations in a competitive society are in some way impoverished.
c) That competition involves treating people as means.
d) That competition harms those who take part, and in particular those who lose. 
5For the purposes of this paper I want to discuss only the last of these 
categories.4 Here the general point is familiar. Economic competition will have at 
least three types of losers: producers who find they can no longer sell their 
goods;5 workers who lose their jobs owing to business failure or through direct 
or indirect competition with other workers (perhaps in low wage economies);6
and, in different cases, consumers who find themselves ‘priced out of the market’ 
(e.g. the housing market).
Of these, the second group has been, historically and for very good 
reason, of the most concern. Thus, Bentham, for example, when advocating the 
introduction of the printing press in Tripoli and Greece, warned ‘care should be 
taken that the employment given to it should not be such as to throw out of 
employment any of the existing scribes, except in so far as other employment not 
                                                
4 Acton competently argues that the alleged harms of the first two types are not 
significant (pp. 67-71, 96-98) although there is much to be said on the other side. 
Acton does not discuss the third type. Elsewhere I have argued that economic 
competition can involve a form of exploitation: exploitation by 
consumers/voters of those engaged in competition, see my ‘The Ethics of 
Economic  Competition’ in The Legal and Moral Aspects of International Trade, 
Freedom and Trade, volume III  ed. A. Qureshi, G. Parry, and H. Steiner (London, 
Routledge 1998), pp. 82-96, republished in revised form as ‘Economic 
Competition: Should We Care About the Losers?’ in H. La Follette (ed) Ethics in 
Practice 2nd Edition (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 551-599.
5 This would also include retailers who find themselves holding stock they 
cannot sell.
6 Direct competition is to compete for the same jobs;  indirect is to offer oneself as 
a worker to a business that will eventually destroy the jobs of others through 
successful competition. It is possible that different moral considerations apply in 
these cases but I will not pursue that here.
6less advantageous is found for them’.7 For Bentham, care needs to be taken both 
to avoid the distress caused to the potentially unemployed, and the likely 
hostility to innovation consequent on such distress. 
Presumably Bentham was thinking of scribes working in government 
service. But consider a private individual, running a copying service, employing 
scribes. Imagine now that another individual has access to greater funds and 
decides to set up a printing press, in competition. At a stroke, let us suppose, this 
will destroy the hand copying business. In the economic ‘survival of the fittest’ 
this business will die out, possibly with the consequent financial ruin of its 
proprietor, in addition to the unemployment of the scribes. Like Bentham we will 
be concerned about the scribes. But in addition, what, morally, should our 
attitude be to the loss, or even ruin, of the proprietor?
Some will say that this is simply a fact of economic life. This could mean 
one of at least two things. First it could be that there is no alternative to an 
economic system with effects of this nature. This seems to me highly doubtful (as 
I shall illustrate below), but in any case it is something that needs to be shown, 
rather than assumed. Second it could mean that this is simply a natural 
consequence of the economic rules we happen to have. But while true, the 
question is whether we should have those rules. Thus the ‘fact of economic life’ 
defence takes us nowhere.
No one can reasonably doubt that when a business fails people suffer 
harm, often of a serious kind. Considering similar cases Acton admits that while 
the idea of the survival of the fittest applies to economic life as well as to 
evolutionary biology, there is an important disanalogy, which makes it less 
                                                
7 Jeremy Bentham, Securities Against Misrule and Other Constitutional Writings for 
Tripoli and Greece ed. Philip Schofield (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990) (written 
1828) p. 38. I thank Philip Schofield for drawing my attention to this text, and 
other writings of Bentham on competition.
7serious in economics. Losers in the biological struggle for survival face a drastic 
end, but when a form of economic life comes to an end it does not necessarily 
involve the ending of life. Rather it merely the ‘cessation of some groupings and 
activities and the assumption and organisation of new ones.’8
However calm and reassuring this may sound one cannot help feel that 
Acton has evaded the main theoretical question. When the printing press is 
introduced, those who run businesses using earlier forms of technology, and do 
not convert to the new technologies, will cease trading, and perhaps face 
financial ruin. Thus their financial interests are destroyed, just as surely as they 
would have been had a rival businessman burned down the premises,9 or if an 
employee disappeared with the year’s takings, or if an agent fraudulent diverted 
revenue into her own back account. Thus loss by competition, arson, theft and 
fraud can, in principle, involve the same level and type of loss, at least from the 
point of view of the person who loses. This is a point that is easily overlooked. 
We have somehow come to believe that a financial loss caused by fraud, theft or 
arson is morally unacceptable, but a financial loss of the same magnitude 
resulting from economic competition is merely unfortunate.10
                                                
8 Although he concedes that it can lead to suicide and death by hunger (p. 73).
9 Here I ignore any issues of insurance or redress. In the case of arson even if 
insurance or compensation is paid out, this does not show that arson is morally 
permissible.
10  It might be suggested that losses in economic competition differ in that the 
risks are voluntarily taken, whereas this is not the case for fraud, theft and arson.
Thus those who draw a line between chance and choice and consequently hold 
individuals responsible for the effects of their choices may suppose they can 
explain the asymmetry. There may be some plausibility to this, although one 
possible reply is that the plausibility of such a distinction depends on falsely 
assimilating many different types of risk (see Michael Otsuka Liberty, Equality, 
8Under capitalism one is given rights against loss by fraud theft or arson, but not 
against loss by competition. This cries out for explanation. The fact that no-one 
need die hardly goes to explain why, in one case the loss is considered a normal 
part of life, but not in the other three cases. No one need die in ordinary cases of 
fraud, theft and arson (although they might, especially in the last), and the fact 
that people normally manage to carry on with some or other form of economic 
activity after suffering competitive losses, hardly shows that these losses are not 
of significant moral concern. After all, fraud, theft and arson do not bring the 
economy to a halt either. 
2. The Liberty Argument
Probably the most common attempted defence of free competition, from a liberal 
or deontological libertarian perspective, is to say that the right to engage in 
economic competition is a simple implication of the right to liberty. The right to 
liberty gives people a right to trade; to buy and sell as they wish. Hence it is 
entirely unproblematic.
It should already be clear, though, what it is wrong with this argument. 
The right to liberty is never a right to act in all ways you wish to, including ways 
that harm others. My right to liberty does not give me the right to choose exactly 
                                                                                                                                                
Envy, and  Abstraction’, in Justine Burley, ed., Dworkin  and His Critics 
(Blackwells, 2004), pp. 70-78, and Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, K., 2001, “Equality, 
Option Luck, and Responsibility”, Ethics 111, 548-579). But aside from that, this 
proposal does not seem to cut cases the right way. A person who knowingly 
moves to a high-crime area to take advantage of the lower property prices still 
has rights against theft; the businessman who, perhaps reasonably in the 
circumstances, fails to anticipate shifting technologies, does not thereby gain 
rights of protection.
9how I will use my automatic machine gun, or even my petrol and matches. There 
is, in general, no liberty to act in ways that are harmful to others. So if economic 
competition does harm people, as John Stuart Mill argued, then no simple appeal 
to liberty will explain why it is to be permitted. In sum, the liberty argument 
works only if it can be shown that damage suffered in economic competition is 
not harm. But as Mill pointed out, it looks very much like harm, and so if this 
move is made some deeper explanation is needed.
3. The Consequentialist Argument
No doubt the blindingly obvious thing to say is that we allow economic 
competition on consequentialist grounds, and indeed this is Mill’s own 
argument. The sad financial loss of those running an obsolete or inefficient 
business is the downside of a system with a lot of good to it, as outlined in the 
first section of this paper. This is a reason for allowing competition: the economic 
analogue of the ‘best of all possible worlds’ defence to the problem of evil. 
Whether those who lose out should be given compensation, or some sort of 
safety net, or nothing at all, will depend on further features of the 
consequentialist theory one holds, together with a calculation of the 
consequences. But giving people rights to be protected against economic 
competition (as distinct from rights to be given relief from the worst effects of 
economic competition) will be bound to be inefficient in important ways, and 
thus is not a candidate option for a consequentialist.
My first main point can now easily be appreciated. We are owed an 
explanation of why contemporary capitalism provides rights against fraud, theft 
and arson, but not rights against economic competition. Standard arguments, 
appealing to considerations such as the advantages of economic efficiency are 
available only to those who have availed themselves of those arguments. This 
will include almost everyone except the pure deontological libertarian. This, I 
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hope, is a surprising conclusion: those who (apparently) speak most in favour of 
the free market and free competition are, prima facie, in the worst possible 
position to defend it. It thus remains unclear, at this point, whether libertarians 
can even allow pure capitalism, still less that it provides a defence for it.
What else might be said to reconnect deontological libertarianism and 
capitalism? The only direct discussion of any relevance to the issue I have seen, is 
by Richard Arneson. In a discussion of Lockean Self-Ownership Arneson is 
interested in the Lockean understanding of the concept of ‘harm to others’, 
noting a number of nuances in the view. One such is ‘hurts that come about by 
fair competition do not qualify as harms’.11 This is exactly the doctrine that 
deontological libertarianism needs. (The consequentialist can, of course, allow 
that economic competition causes harm, but argue that this harm is outweighted. 
The deontological libertarian cannot.) To defend this doctrine Arneson points out 
that, in the absence of long term contracts, customers have a right to withdraw 
custom for any reason or none. Now it is not clear from the context whether 
Arneson thinks this is a good defence, but it is also not entirely clear how this is 
supposed to function as a defence. Consider the case of the hand-copying 
business. Here the businessman complains that the printing press has harmed 
him by luring away customers. To this it is replied that the customers could have 
left for other reasons if they had wanted to. Now this may be true, but it is far 
from clear that it is relevant. After all, it is not being claimed that the customers
did leave for other reasons; merely that they could have legitimately done so if they 
wanted. But this does not answer the point that, in the circumstances as they are, 
harm has been caused by another person setting up a competing business.
Perhaps the argument is a different one: the operative claim would be that 
one cannot complain about the damage caused by economic competition, 
                                                
11 Richard J. Arneson, ‘Lockean Self-Ownership: Towards a Demolition’, Political 
Studies 1991, 36-54, p. 39.
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because the damage is exactly equivalent to a damage that could have been 
caused by a means that is already acknowledged to be perfectly legitimate: 
customers withdrawing their trade on a whim. Now there are two types of reply 
to this argument. The first is that it is double edged; perhaps we should 
investigate whether it really should be legitimate for customers to withdraw 
their business just because they feel like it (certainly some people feel a moral 
obligation not to do so, especially, say, with regard to vulnerable small 
businesses). But we need not go down that road, for the second reply is already 
implicit in arguments already given. Consider the employee who absconds with 
the year’s profits. It is hardly a good defence to point out that exactly similar 
damage would have been caused had all customers legitimately withdrawn their 
business this year. So it remains unclear how this argument shows that hurts 
caused by fair economic competition are not harms. So far it appears that we will 
make no progress on this without appeal to consequentialist considerations: 
competition causes harm which are not different in kind to different sources of 
harm. Rather it is different in its consequences and it is these consequences which 
serve as its justification.  If this is right then deontological libertarianism is in 
serious trouble.
4. The Self-Ownership Argument
Arneson’s discussion of self-ownership, although critical in intent, nevertheless 
gives the libertarian a clue about how to develop an alternative approach. If a 
consequentialist libertarian appeals to beneficial consequences then a 
deontological libertarian ought to appeal to rights; specifically rights of self-
ownership. Any form of deontological libertarianism needs a foundational set of 
rights if it is to be able to set out a theory of what counts as acceptable and 
unacceptable behaviour. Some rights seem naturally to fall out of the libertarian 
concern for individual sovereignty, such as rights to life and to freedom against 
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coercion by others. However it appears that a libertarian may set out his or her 
own catalogue of the rights which constitute self-ownership, and so, it seems, in 
principle there is no reason why this catalogue should not contain a right to 
engage in economic competition and no right to be protected against it.
Now formally there may appear to be one strong reason against this suggestion. 
Typically libertarian rights of self-ownership are formulated as negative rights of 
non-interference: the right not to be assaulted, or not to have one’s property 
taken with consent (unless it has been forfeited through acts that interfere with 
other people’s rights), or not to have one’s freedom of thought limited. The 
question is whether the freedom to enter any branch of economic activity can be 
seen in the same way. The concern is that it is a positive right. This generates 
two, perhaps related, problems. The first is simply that it is out of philosophical 
character for a libertarian to appeal to positive rights, or positive liberties. The 
second is that the great danger of positive rights and liberties is that they may 
clash with negative rights or liberties of others, and within deontological 
libertarianism there seems to be no way of adjudicating such disputes.
It may seem, on the face of it, that both problems have a ready answer. 
The libertarian objects to these positive rights which create positive duties for 
others. The right to engage in any branch of economic activity is not of this sort. 
Indeed it may be better conceived as the right not to be stopped from engaging 
in any branch of economic activity, and thereby in essence is a negative right. 
Formally, then, it seems possible to overcome the first objection. Yet this does not 
solve the second problem. As we saw, the exercise of such economic freedom 
commonly does do harm to others by diminishing their financial prospects. Is 
this not, then, a paradigm of the type of interference to which the libertarian 
objects? But of course the same appeal to a catalogue of rights constituting self-
ownership which sanctions free economic activity provides the answer: there 
never was a right to be protected against the effects of economic competition. So 
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there is no right with which this permission (conceived, we saw, as a prohibition 
on people stopping me) will conflict. Any potential conflict is resolved in favour 
of the economic innovator – the new competitor – at the ground floor level of 
defining the rights of self-ownership.
Although setting rules for philosophical debate is always difficult, and can 
seems a rather arrogant pretension, nevertheless this proposal, it seems to me, 
has all the benefits of theft over honest toil, to use Bertrand Russell’s famous 
phrase. In this case the theft is from consequentialism. How remarkable it is that 
a deontological libertarian should, through the exercise of pure reason, derive a 
set of rights which, in their approval of the free market, coincides with that his or 
her consequentialist colleagues can defend on the basis of actual arguments! The 
proposal to encode or embed an acceptance of free competition into the 
foundational rights of self-ownership looks like the smuggling of 
consequentialist considerations into the very foundations of deontological 
libertarianism. 
My argument then, is not that I can refute the thesis that the rights of self-
ownership automatically include the right to engage in economic competition, 
but rather that this is a somewhat disreputable claim, made in an purely ad hoc 
way, to make deontological libertarianism appear far more ‘capitalism friendly’ 
than it really is. Rather than answering the challenge of this paper, the self-
ownership defence simply defines it out of existence. It simply fails to engage 
with the problem.
5. The No-Alternative Response.
Somehow, nevertheless, I doubt that those who favour deontological 
libertarianism will feel much exercised by the arguments so far. In reply to the 
last argument they may well say that any theory needs some undefended 
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foundational assumptions, and these are the ones most suitable for deontological 
libertarianism (although I hope that they will have the grace to feel at least a little 
embarrassed in making this reply). But furthermore, they may say, what is the 
alternative to free competition except a centrally planned economy, in which 
spheres of economic activity are centrally allocated? And if this is the only choice 
it should not be too difficult to find deontological libertarian reasons, of a 
perfectly ordinary and non-question begging form, for favouring free 
competition over planning.
There is, of course, a question of whether this is an adequate defence even 
if it is true that there are deontological liberal reasons that speak in favour of free 
competition over central planning. But as a preliminary we can note that it is 
simply not true that these are the only two alternatives. We can motivate a third 
alternative by considering how libertarians argue that property should be 
distributed. 
Any theory of justice which does not suppose everything is commonly 
owned must answer the question of how property is to be placed in individual 
hands; this is the issue of first appropriation or initial acquisition of private 
property. Once more a deontological libertarian will have a more restricted set of 
options than those who are prepared to accept consequentialist reasoning. There 
are various libertarian proposals, but it seems to me that at the core of a number 
of ‘right-libertarian’ schemes is essentially a single, simple idea: the right of the 
first claimant, hedged, perhaps, by some other necessary conditions. Now if 
libertarians are prepared to distribute land in this way, why not distribute forms 
of economic activity this way too? That is, whoever is the first to produce goods 
of a certain kind should have an exclusive right to do so, just as the first person 
to work a piece of land is given the exclusive right to determine how that land is 
to be used.
On this model one of the rights to non-interference enforced by the 
minimal state is the right not to have other people encroach on one’s economic 
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activity. This is a system little discussed in contemporary political philosophy, 
but well-known to historians. It is called ‘feudalism’. I don’t, of course, mean 
serfdom, but the system of monopoly, by which the right to produce a certain 
type of good is protected. 12 This form of feudalism violates one of the key 
assumptions of the model of the perfectly competitive economy – no entry 
barriers. Indeed, it replaces it with its opposite: full entry barriers.  Admittedly, 
in practice the point of such monopolies was to raise revenue for the King, or 
Feudal Lord, and so were granted only to those prepared to pay for the privilege, 
but this does not detract the main point: that it is perfectly possible to have a 
system where spheres of economic activity are granted to the first to claim 
them.13 Indeed we see vestiges of this in patent systems, to which we will return 
very shortly, as well as the granting of special licences for such things as telecom 
bandwidth, casinos, postal services, regulated professions, and so. 
Clearly there will be disadvantages with this system, when generalised 
over the whole economy, especially from the point of view of the consumer; this, 
no doubt, is why feudalism died out. But whether these are disadvantages that 
                                                
12 cf Christopher Hill, The Century of Revolution 1603-1714 (Wokingham: Van 
Nostrand Reinhold (UK) Co. Ltd, Second Edition, 1980), p. 25-6. Hill writes ‘It is 
difficult for us to picture to ourselves the life of a man living in a house built with 
monopoly bricks, with windows (if any) of monopoly glass; heated by monopoly 
coal (in Ireland monopoly timber), burning in a grate made of monopoly iron. 
His walls were lined with monopoly tapestries. He slept on monopoly feathers, 
did his hair with monopoly brushes and combs... .’ Hill’s list goes on and on, 
incorporating soap, buttons, lobsters, lute-strings, candles, books, mousetraps 
and many other items. He notes that in 1621 there were said to be 700 such 
monopolies in England.
13  Clearly some means of distinguishing spheres of economic activity will be 
necessary, but there is no reason to think that this is an insuperable difficulty.
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can be based on reasons available to the pure deontological libertarian is a 
further question. Certainly, to repeat a point already made several times, for 
such a libertarian nothing starting from premises based on efficiency or utility 
can be used.
So I am not pretending that feudalism is a superior scheme to free 
competition. It is, however, interesting to note that it is in certain ways consonant 
with libertarian ideas, and with some strands of current economic practice. Note, 
though, there are two quite different ways in which a monopoly can be granted, 
and both are used in contemporary economic systems: patent systems and a pure 
monopoly. A patent system gives the owner the right to licence others to 
produce that good, whereas a pure monopoly is not assignable. Both protect the 
monopoly holder from economic competition, but a patent system is consistent 
with competition between those who are licensed by the patent holder, at the 
discretion of the patent holder. 
Consequently we need to consider two alternatives to the free market and 
the centrally planned economy: feudalism of patents and feudalism of pure 
monopoly. Such schemes have some intellectual attraction. If one thinks of the 
designer of a new scheme of economic activity as an inventor then it may seem 
entirely appropriate to think that they should have some sort of intellectual 
property right over what one has devised. If one can stake a claim at the land 
frontier, should not a libertarian allow one to stake one’s claim at the frontier of 
ideas? Indeed if anything the case looks stronger for intellectual property. In the 
case of land something must change its status from no-one’s property to 
someone’s property; a notoriously difficult transition. But for intellectual 
property no similar transition is needed.
There are vexed issues here. One need only look at the discussion of gene-
patenting to see this. Mixed in are issues of public utility, incentives, rights of 
discovers, rights of possessors and rights of others engaged in similar work. 
Nevertheless the idea of intrinsic intellectual property rights is part of the 
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discussion and there seems some sort of natural justice to the idea that those who 
have made a discovery have a greater claim to exploit it than others. Or, at least, 
if anyone should say this then a deontological libertarian should. And having 
said that, it is hard to see, for such a libertarian, what arguments there might be 
on the other side.
To recap, I have argued that the deontological libertarian owes an 
explanation of why we should have rights to be protected against theft and 
arson, but not to protection against similar damage caused by economic 
competition. No appeal can be made to consequentialist, efficiency, or, for that 
matter, social justice, grounds. No simple appeal to liberty will help. And it 
cannot be said that we cannot imagine a system which embodies such 
protections, for a system either of pure monopoly or of permanent patents would 
do the trick. And I have further suggested that such a system seems to comport 
well with a libertarian view of private property. So we have the intermediate 
conclusion that deontological libertarians should have argued for a form of 
feudalism, rather than capitalism. This may seem absurd. But that is not my 
problem.
6. The Lockean Proviso Response
However, the libertarian still has at least one promising reply to this argument. 
Remember that the libertarian view of property, at least in Nozick’s hands, is not 
merely the right of the first claimant. Some version of the Lockean proviso is also 
necessary. The counter argument, then, will be that the type of feudal monopoly 
under consideration violates the Lockean proviso in its effects on those who do 
not find themselves with a lucrative monopoly, and if this is so libertarianism is 
not consistent with the form of protected monopoly as discussed in this paper. It 
is easy to see how the argument goes. While individual private property in land 
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meets the Lockean proviso, individual private property in a sphere of economic 
activity fails to meet the proviso, and so arguments for monopoly cannot be 
modelled on arguments for land. 
Clearly it is important to investigate this in detail. The key question is 
whether the Lockean proviso can be formulated in such a way as to bring out 
this disanalogy. Now the Lockean proviso comes in various strengths and forms. 
Its strongest Lockean formulation, which may be stronger than even Locke 
intended, suggests that appropriation is only acceptable if each act of 
appropriation leaves ‘enough and as good’ for others to appropriate. However, 
given that such a strong form will be very rarely satisfied, especially on a strict 
reading of ‘as good’ where geographical location such as proximity to markets is 
included as a factor, then a weaker interpretation is needed if the proviso is not 
to backfire and rule out private property.
The most common response is to weaken the proviso so that it refers, 
ultimately, to the idea that appropriation must not make non-appropriators 
worse off. This leads us to the notorious problem of the baseline ‘worse off than 
what?’ Now, much discussion of this looks at the issue of whether it is possible to 
defend an account of the baseline which appears to be fair to non-appropriators. 
However, given that for the present purposes I am engaged in exploring whether 
libertarian arguments can deliver libertarian institutions, external considerations
of fairness are not the issue. Rather we need to see if there is a version of the 
proviso which will protect the type of property rights libertarians generally 
favour. Hence we need to explore how libertarians can understand what it 
means to obey the proviso that people are to be made ‘no worse off’. This 
proviso is not violated merely by the fact that there is no land left to appropriate. 
It could be, for example, that the new opportunity to work as a day labourer 
leaves me no worse off.
But still, we need to know ‘worse off than what?’ and here the salient 
point is that there are two ways of understanding this comparison: what we 
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could call the ‘local’ and the ‘global’. The local reading is that each individual 
appropriation must leave everyone else no worse off than they would have been without 
that particular appropriation. If I am a farmer relying on a path over common land 
to take my goods to market then I will be made worse off if part of this common 
land is appropriated and I now have to go the long way round.14 So the local 
reading provides a heavy burden, and may well be unlikely to be met. Anyone’s 
appropriation is likely to make a least one person worse off in an uncompensated 
way. The global reading, by contrast, is that each person must be no worse off 
than they would have been had there been no system of individual appropriation at all. 
In this case the first farmer can hardly complain, receiving great benefits from the 
system of private property. Hence if the Lockean proviso is not to rule out most, 
if not all, private property claims it has to be interpreted in global fashion. The 
test is simply whether I am worse off for the general system of appropriation of 
land than I would have been without it. If I am worse off, then I have a justified 
complaint.15
Accordingly, we need to exercise some care in applying the proviso to the 
case of monopoly of economic sphere. Suppose I am the first person to work out 
how to cure leather, and so thereby acquire a monopoly right over this activity. 
Would that violate the proviso? Applying the local proviso may render this 
problematic. Where there is a monopoly prices will be higher than otherwise, 
and this will also frustrate those who wish to cure and sell leather. Hence the 
local proviso will be violated. Yet, as we have already seen, the local proviso 
cannot be the correct one to apply, as it would also rule out private property. We 
must, therefore, explore whether the global version is also violated. That is, I am 
justified in my complaint against the system of monopoly if I am worse off with 
                                                
14  For the purposes of this argument I ignore the point that competition with a 
second farmer might cut into my revenue.
15  For defence of this as a reading of Nozick see my Robert Nozick: Property, Justice 
and the Minimal State (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), pp. 112.
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it than I would have been without it. Thus a libertarian may claim that, as many 
will be worse off for the existence of monopoly, as against free entry to trade, the 
Lockean proviso is violated. Furthermore as compensation would be so broadly 
required and expensive, the only solution is to abolish monopolies altogether.
The opponent of libertarianism might respond that this is a dangerous 
argument for the libertarian to use. For what goes for professions must also go 
for land too. If the Lockean proviso rules out monopolising trade, then surely it 
must rule out monopolising land. So if I am worse off for being excluded from all 
occupied professions, then it seems likely that I will be worse off for being 
excluded from all occupied land. Conversely, then, if the libertarian tells the 
landless to work for the landed can we not say the same to those who are not 
permitted to trade in their own right: can go and work for someone else.16 Thus, 
it will be said, it is hard to see why the issues of land ownership and sphere-of-
economic-activity ownership should not run in parallel.
But the libertarian may well have a response. The efficiency argument for 
individual private property can be used as an argument to show that it will make 
the worst off better off. But in the case of monopolies of professions, it will be 
claimed, the efficiency considerations work the other way round: that is, 
efficiency speaks against monopolising professions. Now, this is a hard 
argument to assess. No one would now argue that a feudal system is more 
efficient in utilitarian terms than free competition, but that argument is not 
available to the deontological libertarian. The only question is whether a system 
of monopoly production makes the worst off worse off than they would be 
without it. How would they be without it? We cannot say: in a system of free 
                                                
16 This assumes, of course, that ‘selling unskilled labour’ is not a sphere of 
economic activity to which one person can claim an exclusive licence. This 
general permissibility would seem derivable from rights of self-ownership. 
Highly skilled, or differentiated, labour may be a different case.
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trade. This is because free trade involves economic competition, and economic 
competition harms the interests of those who lose. Therefore we have come full 
circle. A system of free-trade is not a neutral baseline for comparison. We cannot 
use the system involving economic competition as the baseline against which we 
judge whether monopoly makes people worse off, when we lack any justification 
for economic competition. Hence it is simply unclear whether feudalism –
monopoly production - follows from libertarian assumptions, or is ruled out by 
them. 
But let us suppose that the libertarian is right that monopoly production is 
ruled out. Where does this leave us? I have argued that the libertarian has to 
show that the damage caused by economic competition is permissible: that it is 
not real harm. This, I suggested, could not be done without appeal to 
consequentialist reasoning. Nevertheless, I suggested that the libertarian will not 
be much exercised by this, thinking that the only two alternatives are capitalism 
and central planning, and the latter can easily be ruled out on libertarian 
grounds. I provisionally suggested that this was a mistake: there is a third
alternative, feudalism, which appeared to comport well with libertarianism. But 
we have now seen that it may well be that feudalism can also be ruled out on 
libertarian grounds. Does this mean, then, that the link between libertarianism 
and capitalism is re-established?
A moment’s reflection makes clear that this is not the case. If 
libertarianism rules out central planning and feudalism, it does not follow that 
this shows that it is consistent with free market capitalism. We have already seen, 
right from the beginning, that it is not: it has no resources for explaining why one 
type of damage is to be protected by law and another is not. So deontological 
libertarianism is not consistent with any sort of economy that we know of: even 
if, as is unclear, it can rescue itself from entanglement with feudalism does not 
reconcile it with capitalism.
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Remember the key issue is to explain why we should not have rights to be 
protected from the losses consequent on economic competition. I have not found 
any explanation on which a deontological libertarian can draw. Perhaps there are 
arguments I have missed. If so, I would like to see them. But in their absence I 
must conclude that deontological libertarians are unable to justify the libertarian 
institution of the free market (unless they dishonestly smuggle in 
consequentialist considerations into the definition of rights of self-ownership). 
Libertarian rights form a foundation for no known economic system.17
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17 I’m very grateful to Hillel Steiner, Chandran Kukathas, Roger Crisp, John 
O’Neill, and Michael Otsuka for their comments.
